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Nature of the Case 
The District Court, the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse presiding, entered its Order 
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation December 16, 1988. The Order of 
Probation was for a 5 year period. The Order Withholding Judgment was for the same 
5 year period. The Order Withholding Judgment required that the case "shall be 
dismissed" upon its expiration date following a showing that the Appellant had complied 
with the terms of the Order of Probation. A Second Amended Order Withholding 
Judgment and Ordering Probation was entered June 21, 1990. The probation terms 
were enlarged to allow the Appellant unsupervised contact with minors in public places, 
and with his new nuclear family. The order for mandatory dismissal was maintained. 
On October 9, 1992, the District Court dissolved and terminated the Order of Probation. 
The Order of Withheld Judgment was also entered October 9, 1992. The District Court 
held that the Appellant had substantially complied with the Order of Probation. This is a 
final order. It was not appealed. Based upon this order, the Appellant is entitled to the 
dismissal of this action and restoration of his civil rights pursuant to Sec. 18-310(2), I.C. 
The Appellant moved to Montana in 1999. As a resident of Montana, the Appellant filed 
a motion for dismissal, pro se, December 14, 2010. The District Court denied the 
motion, asserting jurisdiction and discretion pursuant to Section 19-2604(1), I.C. The 
District Court does not have jurisdiction to amend or modify a final order. It does not 
have the discretion to amend or modify a final order. Judicial discretion was properly 
exercised by the original District Court. The District Court should be required to comply 
with the Orders of Judge Newhouse and dismiss the case. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On December 16, 1988, the District Court, the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse 
presiding, entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation. The 
Appellant was placed on probation for 5 years and was given a withheld judgment for 
the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment, and upon 
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a showing that Mr. Dieter had complied with the terms of the Order of Probation, the 
Order Withholding Judgment required that his case be dismissed.(R.000010A-00010D). 
Mr. Dieter pled guilty to the crime of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. 
The minor was age 15 when their relationship began in 1986. She was age 16 when it 
ended in 1987. Pre-Sentence Report pg.1, (R.000152). She was age 17 when the 
District Court entered the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation. The 
Order of Probation did not allow the Appellant to have contact with the minor, until she 
turned 18, without the consent of the probation officer. See Order Withholding 
Judgment and Order of Probation, paragraph 3, 5, pg 2, (R.000010B). 
A Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) was submitted to the District Court. Defendant's Exhibit 
C, PSR, (R.000151-000162). It reported that the minor had been abandoned by her 
parents who were driving truck, long haul. Further, that the minor had been beaten by 
her violent brother while the two were alone. PSR, pg 1-pg 3, (R.000152-000154). The 
Appellant acted to protect the minor from her abusive brother and helped obtain foster 
care for her. 
The Presentence Investigator recommended probation as set forth in the Pre-Sentence 
Report. Specific consideration was given to the Appellant's lack of any prior record, that 
there was no force in the offense, the Appellant's own parenting relationship with his 
minor son of a prior marriage, and the Appellant's current stable employment. PSR, pg 
11, (R.000153). 
A Psychological Evaluation, dated November 11, 1988, was submitted to the District 
Court. Defendant's Exhibit B, (R.000140-000150). It recommended probation with a 
closely supervising correctional professional, no unsupervised contact with minor 
females, and a court ordered, structured treatment program. (R.000147-000148). 
The recommendations for probation were adopted by the District Court as follows: 
"AND WHEREAS, THE District Court, having ascertained the desirability 
of granting this petition for probation, does hereby order and decree that 
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he be placed on probation, and judgment is hereby withheld for a period of 
5 years, under the following conditions: 
1. That the probation is granted to and accepted by the petitioner ... 
2. That the probationer shall be under the legal custody and control of 
the Director of Probation and Parole ... " Order, pg 2, (R000109). 
The Order of Probation included Specific Conditions. Those directly related to the 
offense were: 
"3. Special Conditions, to wit; 
2. The probationer shall complete any training or counseling program 
established by the probation officer. 
5. The probationer shall have no contact with any minor children or the 
victim, until she turns 18 years of age without the consent of his 
probation officer;" Ibid. 
The Order Withholding Judgment stated: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the expiration of the period 
of this order withholding judgment, or the earlier termination thereof, and 
upon written showing by or on behalf of the defendant that he has fully 
complied with the terms of his probation, then, and in that event, this 
action shall be dismissed." Ibid, pg 3. (R.00011 O). 
On January 10, 1989, the Order of Probation was amended to allow the Appellant to 
have unrestricted visitation with his minor son. Amended Order Withholding Judgment 
and Order of Probation. (R.000011). 
On June 21, 1990, a Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering 
Probation was entered. (R000116-000118). The probation terms were enlarged to 
allow the Appellant unsupervised contact with minors who were with their parents, or 
when in public places where there are minors such as movie theatres, sports activities, 
church activities, school functions, etc. The Appellant was allowed unsupervised 
contact with his new nuclear family. By the amended provisions, the District Court 
determined that the Appellant was a low-risk repeat offender. The decision was based 
in part upon the report of Health Psychology Inc., Dr. Lynn F. Ellis, C.A.C., PhD., 
Defendant's Exhibit A. (R000139). Paragraph 5 in the original order was removed. 
The requirement of no contact with any minor children, and no contact with the minor 
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until she turned 18, without the consent of the probation officer, was deleted. Second 
Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation. Pg. 2. (R.000117). 
The District Court ordered the following amendments: 
"1. Paragraph 5 in each order is deleted. In lieu thereof: 
5. The probationer shall have no sexual contact with a minor. The 
probationer shall have unsupervised contact with his own son. He 
shall have unsupervised contact with minors in public places where 
there are minors such as movie theatres, sports activities, church 
activities, school functions, etc. He shall have unsupervised 
contact with minors where the minors are accompanied by their 
custodial parent or parents. 
2. A paragraph nine will be added to the Special Conditions to read as follows: 
9. Lori Knie, a single parent, and her ten year old daughter, Terry 
Knie, may reside with Philip Dieter at his residence at 904 Logan, 
Boise, Idaho 83713, without supervision upon the following 
conditions. 
First, Lori Knie discuss with her daughter what proper and improper 
touching by an adult is. She is not to refer to the circumstances of 
Mr. Dieter's conviction or parole. The prosecution may have a 
witness to this discussion who shall be someone other that the 
probation officer. 
Second, the probationer shall be required to take a polygraph test. ... 
Third, the probationer shall be required to take a plethysmograph 
test. .. 
Fourth, the probationer shall continue his appointments with Health 
Psychology, Inc, for the next six to eight weeks where education 
and training occur with Mr. Dieter's now nuclear family in 
communications skills and risk factor monitoring. 
Fifth, at the end of the six to eight week period, a hearing shall be 
held in August to review the test results and the living experience of 
the probationer's nuclear family to determine whether this order 
shall become permanent. 
Sixth, should a violation of probation occur prior to August 1990, 
nothing herein shall prevent the Prosecutor from bringing a Motion 
to revoke probation." Ibid, paragraph 1 and 2, (R.000022-000023). 
4 
The Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation became 
final. It was not appealed. 
Two years later, with one year remaining on the term of probation, the State of Idaho 
filed a Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation alleging violations of 
the original Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation. Motion and Order for 
Bench Warrant, (R.000036-R.000038). The motion sought revocation of Appellant's 
probation and imposition of sentence, i.e. one year of incarceration. The Bench warrant 
was entered by the District Court, ex parte. Ibid, pg 4. (R.000038). 
On September 22, 1992, the Appellant's Motion Opposing Order for Bench Warrant for 
Probation Violation was filed. (R.000039). The Motion represented that the Appellant 
had complied with all the terms of probation for the original order, and as amended, and 
completed 4 years of the 5 year probation period. These facts were set forth in the 
Affidavit of Philip Dieter, (R000051), the Affidavit of Lori Dieter, (R.000041), and the 
Affidavit of Paul Richard Bearce, the Defendant's employer, (R.000047). The Affidavit 
of Philip Dieter established that the alleged violations were in error and the Court so 
ruled. The alleged violations were based upon the absolute restrictions of the original 
order, not the expanded terms of the Second Amended Order. Ibid. 
On October 8, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge Newhouse who determined that 
the Appellant had not violated the probation conditions set forth in the Second Amended 
Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation. The Order Terminating 
Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment 
was entered October 9, 1992. (R.00059-00060). It stated: 
"1. This Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of 
Probation December 16, 1988, which included that upon the 
expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment or the earlier 
termination thereof, and upon a proper showing of compliance by the 
Defendant, this action would be dismissed. 
2. Approximately four years of the five year probation has elapsed and 
the Defendant has substantially complied with the said Order. 
3. The fifth year of the Order of Probation is terminated. 
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4. The Order of Probation as entered and as subsequently amended is 
hereby dissolved. 
5. As a consequence and pursuant to the Order entered December 16, 
1988, the original Judgment and as it was subsequently amended is 
withheld, and the clerk is appropriately directed to do so. 
6. Nothing herein will prevent the Court from considering the Defendant's 
record upon sentencing should he be found guilty of any subsequent 
offense." Ibid, pg 2, (R. 00060). 
By this order, the Court determined that the Appellant no longer presented a risk to re-
offend. 
In 1993, the Idaho Legislature passed the Sex Offender Registration Act, I.C. §§ 18-
8301 to 18-8311. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 155, § 1, p. 391. The enactment date of 
the Act was July 1, 1993. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d). This Act does not apply to Mr. Dieter as 
his Order of Probation was dissolved and terminated on October 9, 1992 prior to the 
enactment date of July 1, 1993. State of Idaho vs, Hartwig, 2011 Opinion No.9, p.2. 
(Idaho 2011). 
On September 16, 1999, the Appellant filed a Motion for Expungement. (R00061). The 
motion was denied December 30, 1999. (R00068). 
In 1999, the Defendant moved to Anaconda, Montana. (Tr. Pg 9, In.23; Pg 10, In.5). 
He has resided and worked in Montana at all times thereafter. He now lives in Lewistown, 
Montana with his wife Kellie Dieter. They married two years ago. They reside at 404 W. 
Morase St, Lewistown, Montana where they are purchasing their home. She is employed 
at the county hospital, as a manager for environmental services. The Appellant is a 
registered voter in the State of Montana. (Tr. Pg. 12, In.22 - Tr. Pg. 13, In.17). 
On December 14, 2010, eighteen years after the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving 
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment was entered, the 
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, pro se. (R000069). On December 20, 2010, the 
District Court entered its Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to Dismiss. (R000071-
R000074). 
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The District Court stated: 
"Although the Defendant claims he has fully complied with the terms of his 
probation, the record does not fully support this assertion. Based upon 
the partial records before this Court, it appears that on August 17, 1992, a 
Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for PV (parole violation) was filed, 
and a Bench Warrant issued. Although the file does not contain the 
disposition of this Motion, it suggests that the Petitioner failed to abide by 
the terms of his probation. Nevertheless, on October 9, 1992, the Court 
entered an Order Terminating Probation and entering the withheld 
judgment, noting that the Defendant had "substantially complied" with the 
order of probation and withheld judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record in this matter, the Court finds that the Defendant 
has not made a satisfactory showing that he completed his probation while 
abiding by the terms and condition of probation at all times, or that 
dismissal of his charge is in the public interest." (R.00072-00073). 
The District Court erred relying upon partial records. The District Court erred relying upon 
the Prosecutor's Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation, issued ex 
parte, and the Bench Warrant and not considering the Affidavits of Philip Dieter, Lori 
Dieter, and Paul Richard Bearce, the Defendant's employer. The District Court was 
aware that Judge Newhouse had terminated and dissolved the Defendant's Order of 
Probation. It was aware that in doing so, Judge Newhouse found that the Defendant 
had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. The District 
Court chose not to apply this ruling to the identical issue before it. 
On January 14, 2011, Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Appearance, Request for 
Evidentiary Hearing, and Notice of Evidentiary Hearing. (R.000075-000080). The 
hearing was held February 4, 2011. (Tr. Pg. 1-49). On February 17, 2011, the District 
Court entered its Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of 
Probation. (R.000124-000129). It again denied the Appellant's motion but removed 
"failure to comply with the terms of probation" as a basis for the denial. It found that the 
decision entered by Judge Newhouse October 9, 1992 was the law of the case. It made 
an independent finding that the Appellant had complied with the terms of his probation 
and was a law abiding citizen. (Ibid. pg 3, R000126). 
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The Memorandum states: 
"There has never been a judicial finding that the defendant violated any 
condition of probation, but a motion was filed by the prosecutor in August, 
1992 alleging various technical violations not amounting to criminal 
conduct. In September 1992, the defendant filed a motion to "dissolve 
probation". Following a hearing, Judge Newhouse entered an order on 
October 9, 1992, dissolving and terminating probation. In the order, Judge 
Newhouse found that the defendant "has substantially complied with the 
order (of probation}." Judge Newhouse's finding necessarily is the law of 
the case. 
There is nothing in the record showing that the defendant has not been a 
law-abiding citizen between October 1992 and the current date. The 
defendant now is in his 50's. He is partially disabled due to one or more 
industrial accidents and also suffers from dyslexia. He is married and 
lives in the State of Montana. The defendant is particularly concerned that 
recent changes in Montana law may make information about his past 
conduct known to the public. 
The parties have agreed that I.C. Section 18-8304, concerning registration 
in Idaho of persons sentenced for certain sexual offenses, does not apply 
to this case, because the order withholding judgment was entered prior to 
July 1, 1993, the effective date of I.C. Section 18-8304. 
While the defendant appears to have complied with his conditions of 
probation, the court must also decide whether dismissal is compatible with 
the public interest. That the defendant appears to have been a law 
abiding citizen from 1989 through the current date is a significant factor. .. " 
(R.000125-000126). 
The District Court asserted that it had discretion to grant or deny the Appellant's motion 
to dismiss, stating: 
"The decision whether to grant a dismissal is discretionary, provided that 
the defendant meets the requirements of I.C. Section 19-2604(1). Ibid. 
pg 3. (R.000126). 
Recognizing that the court has discretion in this area, the court 
nevertheless concludes that there has not been a showing that dismissal 
of the charge is compatible with the public interest. The public interest 
requires the continued protection afforded by the original guilty plea." 
(R.000127, pgA). 
The District Court is in error. It does not have jurisdiction to amend or modify the final 
orders entered by a prior District Court. State of Idaho vs. Hartwig. 2011 Opinion No.9 
8 
(Idaho 2011). Original jurisdiction and discretion were properly exercised by the trial 
court with its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 
16, 1988, its Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation 
entered June 21, 1990, and in the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of 
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment, entered October 9, 1992. This 
District Court does not have the jurisdiction to change these final Orders. 
The District Court has no discretion in this case. The statutory discretion in this case 
was properly exercised by the original District Court in the Order Withholding Judgment 
and Order of Probation, entered December 16, 1988, the Second Amended Order 
Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation, entered June 21, 1990, and the Order 
Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding 
Judgment, entered October 9, 1992. 
This District Court held that Judge Newhouse's decision, that the Appellant complied 
with the Order of Probation, was the law of the case. This District Court also 
independently found that the Appellant had complied with the terms of his probation. 
Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation. 
(R. 000 125-000 126). 
The District Court found that the Appellant was a resident of Montana and that the 
Appellant had been a law abiding citizen since 1989. 
The District Court found no facts upon which it could rely to deny the Appellant's motion 
to dismiss. It relied only upon the original guilty plea, entered as part of the Appellant's 
plea bargaining. 
The Motion to Reconsider was filed March 3, 2011. (R.000130-000163). 
The Motion to Reconsider was denied by Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion 
to Reconsider. March 8, 2011. (R000164-166). 
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The Notice of Appeal was filed April 1 ,2011. (R.000167). 
An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed April 19, 2011. (R.000173). 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Does the District Court have the jurisdiction or discretion to amend or modify the 
final orders entered by the original District Court in 1988, 1990, and 1992? 
2. Must the District Court comply with the mandatory dismissal orders of the original 
District Court? 
3. Did the District Court err in refusing to grant the Appellant's motion for dismissal? 
Argument 
1. The District Court does not have the jurisdiction or discretion to amend or modify the 
final orders entered by Judge Newhouse in 1988, 1990 and 1992. 
The District Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation 
December 16, 1988. The Order of Probation was for a 5 year period. The Order 
Withholding Judgment was for the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order 
Withholding Judgment, and upon a showing that the Appellant had complied with the 
terms of the Order for Probation, the Order Withholding Judgment required that the 
case "shall be dismissed". On June 21, 1990, a Second Amended Order Withholding 
Judgment and Ordering Probation was entered. The probation terms were enlarged to 
allow the Appellant full contact with minors in public places and with his new nuclear 
family. The period of years for the Order of Probation and the Order Withholding 
Judgment was not amended. The provision which required that the Appellant's case 
"shall be dismissed" was not amended. The Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving 
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment was entered October 9, 
1992. It dissolved and terminated the Order of Probation. It entered the Order for 
Withheld Judgment. One year remained before it expired. The provision which 
10 
mandated dismissal of the Appellant's case was reaffirmed. Each of the three Orders 
entered by District Judge Robert Newhouse is a final order. No Order was appealed. 
The present District Court ruling amends and removes the mandated provision for 
dismissal of the case. It nullifies the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of 
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment. The District Court does not have 
the jurisdiction to amend or modify a final Order. State of Idaho vs, Hartwig, 2011 
Opinion NO.9 (Idaho 2011). 
2. Judge Robert Newhouse properly exercised judicial discretion in the Order 
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988, the 
Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation, entered 
June 21, 1990, and the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, 
and Entering Order Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992. 
The District Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation 
December 16,1988. The extant statute was Section 19-2601(3) I.C., which authorized 
a court to: 
"3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may 
prescribe and may place the defendant on probation;" 1971, ch.97, § 2, 
pg.210. 
The Appellant was placed on probation for 5 years and was given a withheld judgment 
for the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment, and 
upon a showing that Mr. Dieter had complied with the terms of the Order of Probation, 
the Order Withholding Judgment required that his case be dismissed. The statute was 
amended in 1989 as follows: 
"Sec. 19-2604. I.C. Discharge of Defendant - 1. If sentence has been 
imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, upon application 
of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all 
times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no 
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible 
with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty 
or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge 
the defendant; and this shall apply to cases in which defendants have been 
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convicted and granted probation by the court before this law goes into 
effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final dismissal of the 
case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to 
his civil rights." (emphasis added). See 1989, ch.305, § 1, pg.759. 
By the term "may", the statute gives a District Court the discretion to dismiss the case 
but does not require the District Court to do so. Judge Newhouse exercised that 
discretion when he established the mandatory dismissal provision in the Order 
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988. Judge 
Newhouse exercised that discretion when he reaffirmed the mandatory dismissal 
provision in the Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation 
entered June 21, 1990. The conditions for probation were expanded to give the 
Appellant unsupervised contact with minors in public places, and with his new nuclear 
family. The Appellant met all of the conditions of the Second Amended Order 
Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation. 
Judge Newhouse exercised discretion when he entered the Order Terminating 
Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment on 
October 9, 1992. The Court exercised discretion when it determined that the Appellant 
had substantially complied with the terms of his probation, and then dissolved and 
terminated the Order of Probation. Based upon this determination, the Appellant is 
entitled to the restoration of his civil rights pursuant to Sec. 18-310(2), I.C. The Court 
exercised discretion when it entered the Order Withholding Judgment October 9, 1992. 
On February 17, 2011, the District Court entered its Memorandum and Order 
Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation. (R.000124-000129). It found 
that the prior District Court's determination, that the Appellant had complied with the 
terms of probation, was the law of the case. It made a determination that the 
allegations of probation violations in August 1992 were for technical violations only. It 
made an independent determination that the Appellant had complied with the terms of 
his probation order. The Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, 
and Entering Order Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992 is a judicial 
determination that the Appellant complied with the terms of his probation. The District 
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Court has made the same determination. Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion 
to Dismiss at the End of Probation. (R000125-000126). 
3. The Idaho Sex Offender Registration Act does not apply to the Appellant. 
In 1993, the Idaho Legislature passed the Sex Offender Registration Act, I.C. §§ 18-
8301 to 18-8311. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 155, § 1, p. 391. The enactment date of 
the Act was July 1, 1993. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d). This Act does not apply to Mr. Dieter as 
his Order of Probation was dissolved and terminated on October 9, 1992 prior to its 
enactment date. State of Idaho v. Hartwig, 2011 Opinion No.9, p.2. (Idaho 2011), 
State of Idaho v. Hardwick, 2011 Opinion No. 31, (Idaho 2011). 
4. If the District Court does have discretion, the manner in which the District Court 
arrived at its decision is an abuse of discretion. 
There are no current facts in the record to support the District Court's denial of the 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. There are no current facts which support the District 
Court's conclusion that "the public interest requires the continued protection afforded by 
the original guilty plea." The manner in which the District Court has arrived at its 
decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss is an abuse of discretion. State of 
Idaho v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 145 Idaho 820 (Idaho ApR., 2008). The District Court 
cites the offense in 1986 as the primary basis to deny the Appellant's motion in 2011. 
Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation. 
(R000124-000129). The District Court cites the anti-social attitude of the Appellant 
during his psychological evaluation in November 1988 and the skepticism of the 
evaluator about the Appellant's potential for rehabilitation as a basis to deny the 
Appellant's motion in 2011. Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at 
the End of Probation. (R000124-000129). The District Court is unwilling to recognize 
that Judge Newhouse considered the psychological evaluation and the Appellant's 
potential for rehabilitation when he determined that probation should be ordered and the 
judgment be withheld in the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation 
entered December 16, 1988. The District Court is unwilling to consider the successful 
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rehabilitation that Judge Newhouse specifically recognized in the expanded conditions 
of probation set forth in the Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and 
Ordering Probation, entered June 21, 1990. In its Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to 
Dismiss, the District Court chose not to consider the full record established by Judge 
Newhouse on October 9, 1992 in the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of 
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment. Rather this District Court first 
held that Appellant had violated his probation based upon an assumption made by the 
District Court without supporting evidence. Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to Dismiss. 
(R.000071- R.000074). 
At the evidentiary hearing in 2011, the District Court received undisputed testimony that 
the Appellant had met every condition of probation. The District Court received 
undisputed testimony that granting the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was in the public 
interest. The District Court reversed its position and held that the Appellant had 
complied with the Order of Probation. The District Court held that this was the law of 
the case. The District Court made an independent finding that the Appellant had met 
the conditions of his probation. However, the District Court chose not to comply with the 
mandatory dismissal orders. Finding no factual basis upon which to deny the 
Appellant's motion, the District Court relied upon the guilty plea alone. No consideration 
was given for the rehabilitation of the Appellant and the successful completion of all of 
his conditions for probation. 
Establishing a guilty plea as the "protection standard" for the public would create an 
absolute standard which could not be met. Such an absolute standard would nullify and 
negate the statutory standards established by Section 19-2604(1), I.C. The manner in 
which the District Court has reached its decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss is an abuse of discretion. State of Idaho v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 145 Idaho 
820 (Idaho App., 2008). 
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Conclusion 
The District Court has denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss upon the assumption 
that it has the discretion to grant or deny the motion. This assumption is in error. The 
District Court has neither the jurisdiction nor discretion to amend or modify the Order 
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988, the Second 
Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation entered June 21, 1990, 
or the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order 
Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992. 
Judge Robert Newhouse established the requirements for the mandatory dismissal of 
the Appellant's case in the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation on 
December 16, 1988. Those requirements have been met. A judicial determination was 
made on October 9, 1992 by Judge Newhouse that the Appellant had complied with his 
terms of probation. This is the law of the case. Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving 
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment. 
The Appellant is a law abiding citizen of the State of Montana. He has shown that he 
has been rehabilitated and that he is a valued and respected person in his community. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Idaho Supreme Court direct the District Court to 
comply with Judge Newhouse's Orders and grant the Motion to Dismiss. 
~L 
Dated th~2day of October, 2011. 
BRAY LAW OFFICES CHTD. 
Christopher D. 'y 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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